Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2005

Enrique Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus (selfinsured The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints), and Labor Commission : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard R. Burke; King, Burke and Schaap, P.C.; Attorneys for Petitioner.
Merril F. Nelson; Christian S. Collins; Kirton and McConkie; Alan Hennebold; Utah Labor
Commission; Floyd W. Holm Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, No. 20050745.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2591

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ENRIQUE MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
(Respondent on Certiorari)

Case No.-20050373-SC
(Consolidated with No. 20050750)

MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS (self-insured
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints), and LABOR COMMISSION,
Respondents
(Petitioners on Certiorari).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

Merrill F. Nelson
Christian S. Collins
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
Media-Paymaster Plus

Richard R. Burke
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.
7390 South Creek Road, #104
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801)532-1700
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
Enrique Martinez

Alan Hennebold
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 530-6800
Attorney for Utah Labor Commission
Floyd W. Holm
FILED
392 East 6400 South
UTAH APPELLATE
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8059
MAR 2
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Attorney for Amicus
Curiae
Workers Comnensatinn Fund

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ENRIQUE MARTINEZ,
Petitioner,
(Respondent on Certiorari)

Case No. 20050575-SC
(Consolidated with No. 20050750)

v.
MEDIA-PAYMASTER PLUS (self-insured
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints), and LABOR COMMISSION,
Respondents
(Petitioners on Certiorari).

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LIST OF PARTIES

Merrill F. Nelson
Christian S. Collins
KIRTON & McCONKIE
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
Media-Paymaster Plus

Richard R. Burke
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.
7390 South Creek Road, #104
Sandy, Utah 84093
Telephone: (801)532-1700
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
Enrique Martinez

Alan Hennebold
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
160 East 300 South, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 530-6800
Attorney for Utah Labor Commission
Floyd W. Holm
392 East 6400 South
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8059
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Workers Compensation Fund

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

10

ARGUMENT

13

POINT I.

POINT II.

A.
B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY GAVE LITTLE IF ANY
DEFERENCE TO THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS AS TO
BURDENS OF PROOF

5

EMPLOYERS HAVE THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-413(l)(c) BECAUSE: (A) THE
STATUTE'S PLAIN LANGUAGE SO REQUIRES; (B) THERE WAS NO
CONTRARY LEGISLATIVE INTENT; (C) THE STATUTE CODIFIED
AND EXPANDED UTAH COMMON LAW; AND (D) IT IS
CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC POLICY IN WORKERS
COMPENSATION CASES
7
The Statute Unambiguously Limited Employees' Burden of Proof To
413(l)(b)
8
This Court Should Affirm The Court of Appeals' Decision If It Concludes
That The Statute Is Ambiguous
10
1.
The Legislature Never Intended to Burden Employees With Proving
Part (c)
11
2.
H.B. 150 Does Not Apply To This Case
12
a.
H.B. 150 Improperly Tried To Affect This Case
12
i.
Legislative Admission
15
ii.
Precise Legislative Language With Significant Amicus
Involvement
16
b.
H.B. 150 Did Not Retroactively Apply To This Case
17

I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3„
4.

5,

The Statute's Punctuation and Rules of Statutory Construction Show
That Employers Have The Burden Of Proof Under Part (c)
18
Requiring Employers to Prove Part (c) Was Consistent With
Established Precedent
20
a.
The Martinez Decision Was Consistent With Cases That
Applied the Current Statute
20
b.
The Martinez Decision Is Consistent With Utah Common
Law Of Permanent Total Disability
22
Fhe Martinez Decision Was Consistent With Public Policy in
Workers5 Compensation Cases
26

CONCLUSION

27

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

28

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beaver County v. Utah Tax Comm'«, 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996)

1,5

Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, 993 P.2d 875

19

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976)

12

Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98

19

Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir. 1980) . . . . 13
Drake v. Indus. Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997)

1,6

Foilv. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979)

15

Hardman v. Salt Lake Fleet Mgt., 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986)

23, 24

Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990)

26

Hoskings v. Indus. Comm 'n, 918 P.2d 150 (Utah 1996)

24

Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App. 164, 48 P.3d 252

22

Marshall v. Indus. Comm % 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984)

22, 24, 25

Martinez v. Media-Paymasters Plus, 2004 UT App 278

passim

Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah
1991)

6

Newspaper Agency v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997)

18

Peck v. Eimco Processing Co., 748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987)

23

Pinter Constr. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984)

26

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Sierra Club v. Utah Solid Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335 (Utah App
1998)

6

Smith v. Mity-Lite, 939 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1997)

24

Spencer v. Indus. Comm 'n, 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987)

24

State v. Barrett, 127 P.3d 682 (Utah 2005)

10

Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 Utah 12, 84 P.3d 1201
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.128, 20 L. Ed. 519 (1872)
Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders Inc., 2000 UT 2, 993 P.2d 207
Washington Nat. Ins. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1990)

18, 21, 22
12
8, 26
18

In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 673 F. Supp 411 (W.
D. Wash)
13, 14, 16
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)-(c)

passim

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3

17

Treatises
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

IV
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1:

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that employers have the
burden to prove Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c), where the current
statute incorporated the employee's common law burden of proof and
codified the employer's common law defenses. Standard of Review:
Correction of error, Beaver County v. Utah Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357
(Utah 1996) under a sliding scale for abuse of discretion. Drake v. Indus.
Comm Vz, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). Preservation of issue: Decided by
the Court of Appeals, Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2004 UT App
278 f4.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

Whether the employer or the employee has the burden to prove Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(l)(c) is governed by this Court's interpretation of that statute. The statute is
set forth in Appellants' addendum.
Whether the Labor Commission's denial of benefits was correctly reviewed for
abuse of discretion is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h), and is set forth
verbatim in Appellee's addendum in Respondent's Brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Martinez briefly worked for Media-Paymasters Plus as an extra on a movie
set. Mr. Martinez also held a second job at McDonald's as a fast food worker. On
October 28, 1996, Mr. Martinez sustained significant permanent injuries when he fell
down some stairs on the movie set. His injuries included his neck, right shoulder, and
right hand. Mr. Martinez filed an application for hearing, and the Commission found that
he had sustained the aforementioned injuries, resulting in permanent impairment,
temporary total disability and medical treatment expenses.
Mr. Martinez tried to return to work with both Media-Paymasters Plus and
McDonald's, but neither employer would accommodate his limitations. Mr. Martinez
then applied for social security disability benefits and was awarded benefits as of the day
of his industrial accident. He then filed an application for hearing, seeking an award of
permanent total disability benefits.

'

At the hearing, Mr. Martinez put on evidence that he was entitled to benefits.
Media-Paymasters Plus' only witness testified that there were no jobs he could do, and
that he might only work if an employer created a new job, or modified an existing job
tailored to his limitations. The Administrative Law Judge denied Mr. Martinez's claim,
Mr. Martinez appealed to the Labor Commission, but the Commission denied his appeal.
The Commission concluded that Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of a
fast food worker, and that work was "reasonably available" to him. The Commission did

2
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not mention the employer's admission that no jobs existed that Mr. Martinez could
perform. Mr. Martinez appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's denial. It concluded that
employees need only prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b), and that
employers have the burden to prove the affirmative defenses set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413(l)(c). The court also reviewed the Commission's conclusions for abuse of
discretion. It determined that the Commission abused its discretion when it ignored
limitations it specifically adopted, and when it ignored Media-Paymasters Plus' admission
that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform. This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Employers have the burden to prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(l)(c). The statute codified and modified Utah common law for permanent total
disability claims. At common law, employees had the burden to prove that they were
permanently totally disabled by showing that their industrial injuries prevented them from
performing their jobs. The current statute codified this common law element at Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(ii). The current statute states that employees have the
burden to prove three elements - including the common law requirement - to "establish
entitlement to benefits." Id. at § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii). Just like common law, the
burden then shifts to the employer to prove its affirmative defenses.
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The current statute codified employers' common law defense, namely, the
existence of readily available work. It also expanded employers5 defenses. Under the
current statute, employers can defeat employee's claims by proving one of four listed
defenses: (i) the employee is gainfully employed; (ii) them employee's impairment does
not limit his ability to do basic work activities; (iii) the impairments do not prevent him
from performing the essential functions of his job; and, (iv) the employee can perform
other reasonably available work. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(i)-(iv). The
Commission "shall conclude" that the employees' facts meet all four listed criteria "to
find an employee permanently totally disabled." Id.
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision, and conclude that employers have
the burden to prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c) for several
compelling reasons. First, the plain language of the statute expressly limited employees'
burden of proof to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b). Second, if the Court concludes
that the statute was ambiguous, there was no legislative intent on this issue when the
current statute was passed. Nor was the statement of legislative intent valid under H.B.
150 because the bill violated the separation of powers, and was not expressly retroactive.
Third, holding that employers have the burden to prove the elements of Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(l)(c) was consistent with Utah common law, and the statute used the same
essential common law terms. Finally, holding that employers have the burden to prove
their affirmative defenses is consistent with public policy.

4
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ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY GAVE LITTLE IF ANY
DEFERENCE TO THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS AS TO
BURDEN OF PROOF
The Court of Appeals correctly gave no deference to the Commission's erroneous

determination that employers have the burden to prove part (c). Whether an agency
properly allocated burdens of proof is a question of law is viewed for correctness. Beaver
County v. Utah Tax Comm 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996). "Because the allocation of
burdens of proof is a question of law, and [the applicable code section] does not
'explicitly] grant discretion/ we must 'grant the commission no deference . . . , applying
a correction of error standard [of review].'" Id. at 357 (citations omitted). In that case,
this Court granted no discretion to the tax commission's allocation of who had the burden
of proof.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals properly reviewed for correctness when it
reviewed the Commission's assignment of the burden to prove part (c) to employees. The
statute gave the Labor Commission no discretion to determine who had the burden of
proof, and therefore its decision was entitled to no deference. As to the issue of burden of
proof, this Court should hold that the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed for legal error
with no deference to the Commission's conclusions.
That said, the statute gave the Commission implied discretion to apply the law to
the facts. Where statutes confer implied discretion, reviewing courts apply a sliding scale
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of strictness. Sierra Club v. Utah Solid Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 341
(Utah App 1998) (citing Drake v. Indus. Comm % 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) with
approval). This sliding scale encompasses "varying degrees of strictness, falling
anywhere between a review for correctness and a broad abuse of discretion standard."
Drake, 939 P.2d at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals properly reviewed the Commission's application of the law to the facts
- whether Martinez he could perform the "essential" functions of his job, or whether
work was "reasonably available" - for abuse of discretion. Martinez, 2005 UT App 278

fio.1
But determining burdens of proof was strictly a matter of statutory interpretation,
and should be reviewed for legal error (or something close to it) under Drake. The statute
did not confer the Commission any discretion to engage in strict statutory intepretation;
instead, it implicitly let the Commission apply the law to the facts. The Commission's
erroneous interpretation of the parties burdens of proof was properly reviewed for
correctness (or something close to it), and this Court should affirm the Martinez decision.

1

Abuse of discretion review encompasses review for reasonableness and
rationality. Morton InVl v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581,
587-88 (Utah 1991).
6
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IL

EMPLOYERS HAVE THE BURDEN TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-413Q¥c) BECAUSE: (A) THE STATUTE'S
PLAIN LANGUAGE SO REQUIRES: (B) THERE WAS NO CONTRARY
LEGISLATIVE INTENT: (C) THE STATUTE CODIFIED AND
EXPANDED UTAH COMMON LAW: AND (D) IT IS CONSISTENT WITH
PUBLIC POLICY IN WORKERS COMPENSATION CASES.
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because it correctly held that

employers have the burden to prove Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(c). This Court
should conclude that the statute unambiguously limited employees' burdens of proof to
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(l)(b) [Hereinafter: "part (b)"], and that the employer had
the burden to plead and prove affirmative defenses contained in Utah Code Ann. §34A-2413(l)(c) [Hereinafter: "part (c)"]. Alternatively, if this Court concludes that the statute
was ambiguous as to whether employers must prove the elements of part (c), it should
hold that the employer had the burden, and uphold the Martinez decision for four reasons.
First, the legislature expressed no intent as to who had the burden of proof when it passed
the current statute, and the recent enactment of H.B. 150 was an impermissible attempt by
the legislature to determine the outcome of a pending case, and was invalid, but in any
case, not retroactive. Second, the Martinez decision applied standard grammar and
punctuation to the statute, and was consistent with established rules of statutory
construction. Third, the Martinez decision was consistent with established precedent.
Finally, the Martinez decision was consistent with established public policy in workers'
compensation cases.

7
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A.

The Statute Unambiguously Limited Employees' Burden of Proof To
413(l)(b).

This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because the plain language of the
statute expressly limited employees' burdens of proof to part (b). This Court need not
interpret a statute unless it is truly ambiguous. "The plain language controls the
interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look beyond the plain
language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos v. Mountainland Builders,
Inc., 2000 UT 2, ^ 13, 993 P.2d 207, 210. In this case, the plain language of the statute
shows that employers have the burden to prove part (c).
At the time of Mr. Martinez' accident in 1996, the permanent total disability
statute read in pertinent part:
(b)

(c)

To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
(i)
the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational
disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii)
the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause
of the employee's permanent total disability.
To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall
conclude that:
(i)
the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii)
the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential
functions of the work activities for which the employee has been
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational

8
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(iv)

disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability
claim; and
the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity.

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)-(c)(1994). The plain language of the statute showed
that employers have the burden to prove part (c).
The pertinent portion of the statute consisted of two contrasting parts: part (b) and
part (c). Part (b) specifically listed what employees must prove to "establish entitlement
to permanent total disability benefits." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(l)(b). There were
no other burdens or preconditions to employees' entitlement; only part (b). The plain
language of the statute unambiguously limited employees' burden of proof to part (b).
But the Commission's "conclusions" required under part (c) were qualitatively
different than the facts employees had to prove under part (b). In contrast to part (b), part
(c) required the commission to conclude that (i) the employee was not gainfully
employed, (ii) the impairment limited the employees ability to do basic work activities,
(iii) the employee could not perform the essential functions of the last job, and (iv) that
the employee could not perform other "reasonably available" work. Id. at § 34A-2413(1 )(c)(i)—(iv). Only one possible conclusion can be drawn from the difference
between what employees must prove for "entitlement" under part (b) and what the
commission must conclude under part (c): employers have the burden to prove the facts in

9
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part (c), or the commission "shall conclude" that employees are permanently totally
disabled.
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because employers have the burden
to prove part (c). The plain language of the statute showed that the legislature expressly
limited employees' burden of proof to part (b). When the employee proved those facts,
he established "entitlement to permanent total disability benefits." Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413(l)(b). Employers had to prove part (c), or the commission "shall conclude"
that the employee is permanently totally disabled. Ld. § 34A-2-413(l)(c). This Court
should hold that the statute unambiguously limited employees' burdens of proof to part
(b), and that employers have the burden to prove part (c).
R

This Court Should Affirm The Court of Appeals' Decision If It Concludes
That The Statute Is Ambiguous.

If this Court holds that the statute is ambiguous, it should affirm the Martinez
decision because it was consistent with statutory construction, precedent, and public
policy in interpreting workers compensation statutes. Before addressing those topics,
however, this Court should conclude that the legislature never expressed its intent when it
passed the current statute, and that H.B. 150 was invalid ab initio because it violated the
separation of powers. Consequently, where there is no expressed legislative intent, this
Court must rely on statutory construction, precedent, and public policy in interpreting
workers compensation statutes. State v. Barrett, 127 P.3d 682 (Utah, 2005).
Accordingly, this Court should uphold the Martinez decision.
10
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1.

The Legislature Never Intended to Burden Employees With Proving
Part (c).

This Court should find that there was no legislative intent that employees must
prove part (c) when the current statute was enacted. This Court may take judicial notice
of legislative proceedings. Order at 1, Add. 37. But none of the transcripts provided by
WCF show any legislative discussion on who has the burden of proof under part (c). To
the contrary, the legislators only discussed the definition of permanent total disability, and
not who had the burden of proof. Transcript of proceedings, S.B. 123 at 2.2 This Court
should find that there is no evidence of the legislature's intent as to who has the burden of
proof under part (c). Accordingly, this Court must look to statutory construction,
precedent, and public policy. This Court should affirm the Martinez decision because
statutory construction, precedent, and public policy supported its conclusion that
employers have the burden to prove part (c).

2

In light of this Court's ruling that WCF may not supplement the record,
Appellee's brief cites to the transcripts contained in WCF's brief, which are unofficial.
There are no official transcripts that are part of this record. Therefore, should this Court
find that the cited transcripts are not reliable sources of legislative intent, Appellee would
withdraw this citation, and simply assert that there is no evidence of any legislative intent
in support of Appellants or WCF's arguments.
11
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2.

H.B. 150 Does Not Apply To This Case.

The recent passage of H.B. 1503 has forced Mr. Martinez to address it in this brief.
Appellants' Reply will predictably argue that H.B. 150 disposed of the burden of proof
issue - as if this Court has no further responsibility in this case. This Court, however,
must independently determine the law in this case, especially where the legislature
improperly tried to dictate the result. Before voting, the legislative debate included an
admission that the purpose of H.B. 150 was to correct an "error" in a "recent Court of
Appeals case," Add. 10, thereby affecting the result in this case. Accordingly, this Court
should find that legislative purpose was improper: This Court should hold that H.B. 150
was invalid ab initio because it violated the separation of powers. Alternatively, this
Court should find that H.B. 150 does not retroactively apply to this case.
a.

H.B. 150 Improperly Tried To Affect This Case.

This Court should find that H.B. 150 improperly tried to dictate the outcome of
this case. Legislatures may not decide the rule of law in a pending case. United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47, 20. L. Ed. 519 (1872). Where a law is passed to affect a
pending case, it is invalid because it violates the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-24, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659,

3

This Court granted certiorari on November 16, 2005. H.B. 150 was
introduced in the House on January 24, 2006, and passed the House on February 21,
2006. In the final hours of the last day of the legislative session on March 1, 2006, it
passed the Senate. Last Friday, March 17, 2006, Governor Huntsman signed H.B. 150
into legislation.
12
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96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), (per curiam); Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir. 1980). The facts show that the purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect
this case, and should be invalidated by this Court.
In the case of In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation,
673 F. Supp 411 (W. D. Wash.), the court invalidated legislation under separation of
powers principles because it was passed to affect a pending case. Between 1977 and
1981, the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) issued $2.25 billion in
municipal bonds to finance two major power projects. In 1981, the projects were
terminated and litigation was started under the Washington State Securities Act (WSSA)
to determine the repayment duties of the issuers. The standard of fault required to find
civil liability under WSSA was not explicitly stated in the original legislation, but by
1980, Washington courts had determined that negligence was the applicable standard. Id.
at 414. In 1985, the Washington Legislature amended the WSSA, and raised the standard
of fault to scienter. The legislation was not explicitly retroactive, and in 1986, the federal
district court found that it only applied prospectively. Id. Within two weeks, the
Legislature introduced new legislation (the "1986 Amendment") that was explicitly
retroactive, and the court was again called on to determine the applicability of the law to
the pending litigation. It concluded that the Washington Legislature violated the
constitutional principle of separation of powers when it passed the new legislation. Id. at
415.
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The principle of separation of powers is fundamental to our
system of government in which the legislature is to enact laws
of general application, and courts are to decide particular
cases arising under those laws. Legislative actions which
contravene the principle of separation of powers are
unconstitutional. It is not for the legislature to determine the
rule of decision in a particular case, nor otherwise unduly
impact judicial power to decide pending cases.
Id. (citations omitted). The court found that the Legislature was candid about the purpose
of the 1986 Amendment: to protect Washington utility ratepayers by protecting local
entities, who if found liable, would increase utility rates. Id. The court found that the
Legislature intended the 1986 Amendment to benefit the state's ratepayers by changing
the rule entitling plaintiffs to relief, not by changing the remedy. The court observed that
the remedy remained the same after the 1986 Amendment, but "the quantum and nature
of proof required has been changed to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
against these public defendants." Id. at 416. The court concluded that the 1986
Amendment was an unconstitutional intrusion on the judicial responsibility to resolve
cases and controversies. Id. at 417. Similarly, this Court should find that the legislative
purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect the outcome of this case, and that it violated the
separation of powers.
This Court is fully aware of the seriousness of legislative interference with the
judiciary's responsibility to decide cases and controversies. "We recognize the potential
mischief, indeed, the grave constitutional problems, that could arise if the Legislature
were to attempt to determine the outcome of a particular case by passage of a law
14
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intended to accomplish such a purpose." Foil v. Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah
1979). This Court should find that H.B. 150 was enacted to affect this case because: (1)
the legislators freely admitted that H.B. 150 was to correct an "error" from this "recent
Court of Appeals case"; and (2) the language of H.B. 150 precisely addressed the issue on
appeal with significant input from Amicus WCF. For these reasons, this Court should
find that the legislative purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect this case, and should invalidate
H.B. 150 based on separation of powers principles.
(i)

Legislative Admission

The legislature was told that H.B. 150 was intended to affect the outcome of this
case moments before it voted to pass the bill. Senator Ed Mayne candidly explained:
[H.B. 150] clarifies the long standing view that it is the
workers' burden of proof to show an entitlement to permanent
total disability benefits. A recent Court of Appeals case
removes much of that employees' burden in this regard.
Correcting this error will avoid an increase in claims costs
associated with more permanent total disability cases
generated because of relaxation of employees' burden of
proof.
Add. 10. Where the legislature was specifically told that H.B. 150 would correct the
"error" that was the "recent Court of Appeals case," the express purpose of H.B. 150 was
to affect the outcome of this case.
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(ii)

Precise Legislative Language With Significant
Amicus Involvment.

The language of H.B. 150 shows that it was enacted to affect the specific issues in
this case. H.B. 150 contains, inter alia, amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(l)(b) and (c), specifically making employees prove all elements listed in both (b) and
(c) - the very issue in this case. See Text of H.B. 150, Add. 12-36. Like the 1986
Amendment in the In re Washington Public Power case, H.B. 150 sought to change the
rule entitling Mr. Martinez to relief, and not his remedy. Like the 1986 Amendment,
"the quantum and nature of proof required has been changed to make it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail" under H.B. 150. The language of H.B. 150 shows that it was drafted
to make it more difficult for Mr. Martinez to prevail in this case.
Amicus WCF was also significantly involved with H.B. 150fs passage. When it
asked to be granted Amicus status, WCF told this Court about its financial interest in the
outcome of this case, as a matter of precedent. Motion For Leave To Submit Brief Of
Amicus Curiae at 1. On February 6, 2006, a WCF representative testified in support of
H.B. 150 at the House Business and Labor Committee Meeting. App. 5. WCF told the
legislators that H.B. 150 corrected the Court of Appeals case that had misconstrued the
statute. App.7.4 WCF did not pass H.B. 150, and its participation in the legislative
process was entirely lawful. But it is also evident that WCF was significantly involved in

4

The Appendix contains an internet link to the audio file of the February 6,
2006 meeting.
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H.B. 150's passage, and told legislators that H.B. 150 would correct the Martinez
decision, even as it participated in its appeal.
If this Court finds that the purpose of H.B. 150 was to affect this case, it must
ignore its statement of legislative intent. Under the section, "legislative intent language"
the bill reads:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendments to
Section 34A-2-413 in this bill be interpreted as merely
clarifying an existing principle that the employee bears the
burden of proving that the employee is permanently totally
disabled based on those factors listed as matters on which the
commission is to make a conclusion in Subsection 34A-2413(1 )(c), as enacted before amendment of this bill.
Add. 35-6. But this Court should not defer to the statement of legislative intent where
H.B. 150 violated the separation of powers. Alternatively, if this Court concludes that
H.B. 150 did not violate the separation of powers, it should, at minimum, view H.B. 150
as an inauthentic source of legislative intent, given its dubious beginnings, and its
whirlwind passage during the pendency of this appeal.5
b.

H.B. 150 Did Not Retroactively Apply To This Case.

Even if HB 150 did not violate the separation of powers, this Court should find
that H.B. 150 did not retroactively apply to this case because it contained no clear
statement of retroactive application. Under Utah law, "[n]o part of these revised statutes
is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000).
5

See n.3 and accompanying text.
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Accordingly, in Utah, a statute "generally cannot be given retroactive effect unless the
legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute." Washington Nat. Ins. v.
Sherwood Assoc. 795 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1990) (cited with approval in Thomas v. Color
Country Mgmt., 2004 Utah 12 Tf 31, 84 P.3d 1201, 1210). H.B. 150 did not expressly
state that it retroactively applied to pending cases, consequently, this Court should hold
that it did not apply to this case.

'

'

Nor was H.B. 150 retroactive because it substantively changed the parties burdens'
of proof. H.B. 150 was not "merely procedural": "According to this exception,
amendments that merely alter the procedure by which the substantive rights are
adjudicated are retroactively applicable." Thomas, 2004 Utah 12 ^ 33, 84 P.3d at 1210.
Allocating the parties' burdens of proof was not merely procedural because it changed the
substantive legal requirements for entitlement to permanent total disability benefits.
Accord, Thomas, 2004 Utah 12 f 43, 84 P.3d at 1213. This Court should hold that H.B.
150 has no retroactive application because it is substantively changed the requirements
for permanent total disability benefits.
3.

The Statute's Punctuation and Rules of Statutory Construction Show
That Employers Have The Burden Of Proof Under Part (c).

This Court should affirm the Martinez case because the statute's punctuation and
rules of statutory construction show that employers have the burden to prove part (c).
Applying the "elementary rules of punctuation and grammar" supports the Court of
Appeals' conclusion. Newspaper Agency v. Auditing Div., 938 P2.d 266, 271 (Utah
18
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1997). The Court of Appeals rightly considered the statute's punctuation:
[W]e note that courts should not arbitrarily ignore
punctuation, but [should] give it due consideration and effect
where it may be used as an aid to ascertain the legislature's
purpose. Subsection (l)(b) is a complete sentence ending
with a period. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b) (2001).
Thus, subsection (l)(b)'s assignment of the burden of proof
does not apply to subsection (l)(c).
Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 ^f 7 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Part (b) is a
single and complete statement of the employee's burden of proof: When proven, the
employee has "established entitlement" to permanent total disability benefits. This Court
should find that the statute's punctuation shows that employers have the burden of proof
under part (c).
The statute's construction also shows that employers have the burden to prove part
(c). Part (b) precisely and clearly assigned employees the burden of proof on three issues,
but part (c) did not. This Court has repeatedly stated that the specific inclusion or
exclusion of statutory terms must be considered to understand the meaning of a statute:
"[Statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the
exclusion of another. Thus, we should give effect to any omission in the ordinance
language by presuming that the omission is purposeful." Carrier v. Salt Lake County,
2004 UT 98 130 (citing Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, \ 14, 993 P.2d 875,
1216, with approval) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court of Appeals
correctly considered the statute's specific inclusion of the employee's burden of proof
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under part (b) and its specific exclusion of the employee's burden of proof under part (c):
Because subsection (l)(b) is so clear and explicit on what the
employee has the burden of proving, subsection (l)(c) should
be construed as listing the factors on which the employee does
not have the burden of proof.
Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 ^ 8. This Court should find that the statute specifically
included employees in part (b) and purposefully omitted employees from part (c). If so,
the statute's construction leaves only one possible interpretation: employers have the
burden to prove part (c). This Court should affirm the Martinez decision and hold that
employers have the burden to prove part (c).
4.

Requiring Employers to Prove Part (c) Was Consistent With
Established Precedent.

This Court should uphold the Martinez decision because it is consistent with
precedent, both in cases that applied the current statute, and common law cases that
defined "permanent total disability." The current statute incorporated Utah common law
when it required employees to prove part (b) and left employers to prove part (c).
a.

The Martinez Decision Was Consistent With Cases That
Applied the Current Statute.

This Court should uphold Martinez because it is consistent with permanent total
disability cases that have applied Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. No case has ever
collapsed the distinction between the employees' burden of proof under part (b) and the
employer's burden of proof under part (c), as Appellants have urged this Court to do. To
the contrary, this Court has already outlined employees' burdens under part (b).
20
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In the case of Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt, 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 120, the
employee had been found tentatively permanently totally disabled, and the ALJ ordered
the employer to pay subsistence benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6).
The employer's insurer refused because there was no final enforceable order under Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-212. This Court found that there was a conflict, and reasoned that a
tentative finding of permanent total disability benefits was not an enforceable order. Id.
at ^f 24, 1208. In reaching its conclusion, this Court outlined the process for permanent
total disability claims:
Injured employees seeking permanent total disability
compensation for work-related injuries must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that they have become
permanently totally disabled as a result of an industrial
accident or occupational disease. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(l)(b) (2001).
Thomas, 2004 UT 12 at % 2, 84 P.3d at 1207 (citation to part (b) in original). This Court
specifically cited to part (b) for the employees burden of proof in permanent total
disability cases. This Court also maintained the distinction between employees' burden
of proof under part (b), and the commission's standards under part (c): "An administrative
law judge must review the evidence to determine, essentially, whether the employee is
permanently disabled and unable to perform reasonably available work. Id. § 34A-2413(l)(c)." Id- (citation in original). The Court of Appeals' decision in Martinez is
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consistent with this Court's decision in Thomas.6
b.

The Martinez Decision Is Consistent With Utah Common
Law Of Permanent Total Disability.

This Court should affirm Martinez because it is consistent with common law that
defined "permanent total disability." Among other factors in part (b), employees must
also prove that they are "permanently totally disabled." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(l)(b)(ii). "Permanent total disability" is a term of art under Utah law, and the current
statute did not re-define the term. Consequently, Part (b) of the current statute required
employees to prove that they are "permanently totally disabled" as that term, was defined
at common law.
At common law, employees had to prove their permanent total disability under the
odd lot doctrine.7 To prove permanent total disability, employees had to present evidence
that they could no longer perform their old job duties, then the burden shifted to the
employer:

6

Accord, Intermountain Slurry Seal v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App 164, 48
P.3d 252 (distinguishing between facts employees must prove under part (b) from
Commission's conclusions under part (c)).
7

"Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtually every
jurisdiction, total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any
well-known branch of the labor market." Marshall v. Indus. Comm 'n, 681 P.2d 208, 212
(Utah 1984) (quoting 2 Larson, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.51 at 10164.24 (1983) (footnote omitted)).
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The employee must first present a prima facie case that no
regular, dependable work is available to him. To do this, the
employee must present "evidence that he can no longer
perform the duties required in his occupation and that he
cannot be rehabilitated1'8 to perform some other type of
employment. Once the employee has presented a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence
of regular, steady work that the employee can perform, taking
into account the employee's education [work experience],
mental capacity and age.
Peckv. Eimco Processing Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The odd lot cases cited by Appellants9 support Petitioner's position.
In each cited case, this Court held that the employee had met his burden of proof by
showing that he could no longer perform the duties of his occupation. See Hardman, 725

8

Under the prior statute, employees did not have to prove they could not be
rehabilitated. Instead, they were referred to the Division of Rehabilitation to assess their
re-employment. See Hardman v. Salt Lake Fleet Mgt, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986)
("[W]e did not mean that the employee must prove on his own that he is unable to be
rehabilitated. Such a requirement would place the employee in the untenable position of
assessing his own potential for rehabilitation."). Unlike the prior statute, the current
statute makes employers responsible for rehabilitation. Employers can prepare reemployment plans for permanently totally disabled employees. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2413(6)(ii).
9

This Court stated, "The Act does not set forth, however, those often
unquantifiable factors that establish permanent total disability . . [W]ith regard to
permanent total disability claims, that a worker may be found totally disabled if he can no
longer perform work of the general nature he was performing when injured, or any other
work which a man of his capabilities may be able to do, or to learn to do or for which he
might be trained." Hardman, 725 P.2d 1323, 1325 (internal citations and quotations
omitted). In other words, the Commission must take into account aU relevant facts
submitted into evidence, including those not quantified in the Act. Appellants move the
less argued that employees had to prove "unquantifiable factors," under the common law.
Brief at 15.
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P.2d at 1327-28, and Marshall, 681 P.2d at 213. Similarly, in the Mity-Lite case, the
Court of Appeals held that the employee had made a prima facie showing that he was
permanently totally disabled, noting that "The record contains uncontroverted evidence of
his physical impairment and his inability to perform the work required by his former job
or any similar work." Smith v. Mity-Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah App. 1997). See also,
Hoskings v. Indus. Comm X 918 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah 1996)10, and Spencer v. Indus.
Comm'n, 733 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah 1987).u Under Utah common law, employees proved
they were "permanently totally disabled" if they proved they could no longer perform
their job duties.
Under part (b) of the current statute, employees must still prove they are
"permanently totally disabled" under the common law. The current statute incorporated
that term from the common law, without redefining it. See generally, Utah Code Ann. §
34A-2-413. Taken together with the rest of part (b), employees must prove: (i) significant
impairment from the accident or illness, (ii) that they can no longer perform the duties of
r

their occupations, and (iii) that the accident or illness directly caused the permanent total

10

"Applying the 'odd lot' doctrine, the ALJ first found that Hoskings had met
his burden of proving that the 1986 industrial accident caused his ankle injury and that he
could not return to work as a fire fighter." Hoskings, 918 P.2d at 153.
11

"That information also constitutes prima facie evidence that Spencer can
no longer perform the duties required in his occupation and thus he cannot be
rehabilitated, so that the burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence of regular
steady work that the employee can perform, taking into consideration the employee's
education, mental capacity, and age." Spencer, 733 P.2d at 162.
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disability. Id. Once proven, the employee has "established entitlement" to permanent
total disability benefits, Id. The burden then shifts to the employer. Id. at § 34A-2413(l)(c); Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 ^ 7; accord. Marshall, 681 P.2d at 212.
Just like the common law, the current statute allows employers plead and prove
affirmative defenses, including the existence of readily available work. This Court (and
numerous others) have long recognized that it is most appropriate to have employers
prove there are jobs the employee can do, instead of employees trying prove they can not
work.12 The Martinez decision embodied these established common law principles when
it held that part (c) functioned as employers' affirmative defenses.13 Conversely,
Appellants have cited to no case (Utah or otherwise) where an employee had to prove that
he was universally unemployable to be considered permanent totally disabled. Nor does
the current statute so require, yet this is the crux of Appellant's argument. This Court
should affirm the Court of Appeals' decision in Martinez, because its statutory
interpretation that employers have the burden to prove part (c) is consistent with the
12

"It is much easier for the [employer] to prove the employability of the
[employee] for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to prove the universal
negative of not being employable at any work." Marshall, 681 P.2d at 213 (quotations
and citations omitted).
13

"Thus, if the employee has made her prima facie case, the employer can
rebut the presumption of a permanent total disability award by showing (i) that the
employee is gainfully employed, (ii) that the impairment does not limit the employee's
ability to do basic work activities, (iii) that the industrial-accident-caused impairments do
not 'prevent the employee from performing the essential functions' of the employee's
previous work or (iv) that the employee can "perform other work reasonably available."
Martinez, 2005 UT App 278 \ 1 (footnote omitted).
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current statute's incorporation of Utah common law.
5.

The Martinez Decision Was Consistent With Public Policy in
Workers' Compensation Cases.

This Court should affirm Martinez because it was consistent with this Court's
policy of liberally construing statutory ambiguity in favor of injured employees. Where
the statute is ambiguous, this Court looks to policy considerations. Vigos v.
MountainlandBuilders, 2000 UT 2 at f 13, 993 P.2d 207, 210. This Court construes
workers compensation statutes liberally in favor of finding coverage. Id. "The
Work[ersf] Compensation Act is to be construed liberally to further the statutory purposes
of providing relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents." Pinter Constr. v. Frisby,
678 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1984). "It is the duty of the courts and the commission to
construe the Workers' Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage
when statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction." Heaton v. Second Injury
Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990).
This Court should affirm the Martinez decision and construe part (c) as the
employer's responsibility, because it is consistent with public policy. Construing part (c)
as the employee's responsibility would be construing the Act against coverage because it
increases the substantive requirements for permanent total disability claims, making it
harder for injured workers to prove entitlement to benefits. This Court should affirm the
Martinez decision because it was consistent with construing the Act liberally in favor of
coverage.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should deny Appellant's appeal, and
affirm the Court of Appeals decision in the Martinez case, awarding Mr. Martinez's
permanent total disability benefits.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2006.
Respectfully submitted,
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.

Richard R. Burke
Attorneys for Petitioner Below/Certiorari
Respondent, Enrique Martinez

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 23rd day of March, 2006,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document, first class postage prepaid, to the following:
Merrill F. Nelson
Christian S. Collins
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Alan Hennebold
Labor Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Floyd Holm
Workers Compensation Fund
392 East 6400 South
Murray, Utah 84107

1Z JnUtf^

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

